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This paper focuses on the dynamics of growth, inequality and poverty reduction. Until 
recently, ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ had reigned as the strategic framework of the 
international development community in addressing the inter-relationships among 
growth, inequality and poverty. The concept of ‘Pro- or Growth seemed to satisfy 
both growth enthusiasts and equity advocates by bringing both objectives into a 
common analytical framework and value system. 
 
However, such a marriage of convenience did not survive eventual divorce. 
Nowadays, under the auspices of leading development agencies, such as the World 
Bank and the U.K. Department for International Development, the less demanding 
objective of ‘Inclusive Growth’ has supplanted ‘Pro-P or Growth’. To date, there has 
been no rigorous and comprehensive explanation of the advantages of such a change. 
Nevertheless, ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ appears to be receding into the large dustbin of 
discarded development fads. 
 
However, the practical concerns for combining the acceleration of growth with the 
marked reduction of both inequality and poverty retain a powerful influence. This 
paper attempts to analyze the reasons for the rise and fall of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ in the 
hopes of laying a renewed basis for a substantive discussion of how to combine 
growth with equity.  
 
II.  The World Bank’s Equity and Development Report  
A useful starting point for such an analysis is the World Bank’s 2006 World 
Development Report on ‘Equity and Development’. Drawing on the work f Amartya 
Sen, it acknowledges at the beginning of the report that equity has an intrinsic value 
(namely, it is an end in itself) but the whole report is thereafter concerned with the 
much narrower topic of demonstrating whether greate equity could promote long-
term development (which is often identified with faster long-term economic growth). 
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For the World Bank report, equity means ‘equal opportunities [italics added] to 
pursue a life of one’s own choosing’. Such a definitio  could be interpreted in various 
ways. What factors condition opportunities, for example? The report does not make 
the mistake of believing that the optimal functioning of market mechanisms is a 
guarantee of such opportunities. Instead, it recognizes, to its credit, that the 
distribution of wealth and power in a capitalist economy can cause an unequal 
distribution of opportunities. 
 
One could well question the report’s central thesis that equity and growth are 
complementary. The fact that such a relationship is entertained by the World Bank as 
a possibility should be regarded as a fortuitous development. There is, however, a 
downside to such an approach.  
 
Fostering greater equity (such as in educational att inments) might well enhance long-
term growth. But how likely is such an impact in a capitalist economy based on an 
unequal distribution of wealth and power? Moreover, should we uphold equity 
primarily on the basis of promoting growth? Should equity not be valued as an end in 
itself? Moreover, what if we found—for the sake of argument—that promoting equity 
entailed a sacrifice of growth?  
 
One would hope that such a connection is not generally the case but we simply do not 
know enough empirically about this relationship to draw any firm conclusions. So it is 
possible that greater equity could work, in general, against growth objectives. If 
equity tended to lower economic growth, should we abandon equity as an objective? 
Hopefully not. 
 
III.  The Debate on Pro-Poor Growth 
Let us first relate these issues to our discussion of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’. Within this 
framework, we are concerned with three differentiable, if not independently important, 
objectives: growth, inequality reduction and poverty reduction. Recent discussions of 
poverty reduction have employed a complex analytical framework, the so-called 
 5 
‘Poverty-Growth-Inequality Triangle’, which was popularized in a 2004 paper by 




The analysis starts by posing the objective of poverty r duction. The main means 
promoting such an objective are considered to be fast r growth and greater equity 
(including both an initially lower level of inequality and a reduction in inequality). 
‘Pro-Poor Growth’ has sought to combine both means into one approach. But are both 
completely compatible? 
 
Faster growth usually leads to absolute improvements for all while greater equity 
implies relative improvements for the poor (compared to the state of he non-poor). It 
is possible to achieve the first without the second, or the second without the first. 
 
These simple differences lie at the heart, in fact, of he debate about the character of 
‘Pro-Poor Growth’ and how to measure and evaluate it. The most well-known 
protagonists in this debate have been Nanak Kakwani and Martin Ravallion. 
 
Duelling Definitions 
Kakwani wrote in 2004 a seminal working paper for the International Poverty Centre 
on this topic entitled ‘Pro-Poor Growth: Concepts and Measurements with Country 
Case Studies’. In that same year, the counterpoint t  Kakwani’s argument can be 
found in the World Bank Working Paper by Ravallion entitled ‘Pro-Poor Growth: A 
Primer’. 
 
Initially, each researcher had posed a somewhat different definition of ‘Pro-Poor 
Growth’. Kakwani’s original position stressed the importance of identifying a relative 
improvement in the condition of the poor. For him, this improvement implied that 
“the incomes of the poor grow faster than those of the non-poor”.  
 
In contrast, Ravallion’s original position emphasized that more rapid growth is ‘pro-
poor’ because it is more poverty-reducing. As an example, he pointed to the 
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extraordinary success of China in reducing extreme poverty through rapid economic 
growth—even though its inequality worsened. 
 
Over time, however, the definitions of Kakwani and Ravallion have become more 
similar. They have tended to reach agreement on the ul imate goal of maximizing the 
reduction of poverty. And for this goal, they have tended to agree that both faster 
growth (implying absolute improvements) and greater equity (implying relative 
improvements) should be priorities. Lastly, how to combine the two means now 
appears to be primarily a pragmatic issue for both researchers. 
 
The Mathematics of ‘Pro-Poorness’ 
Let us examine the mathematical expressions of ‘Pro-Po r Growth’ that have been 
developed by Kakwani and Ravallion in order to determine the extent to which they 
differ. 
 
In a 2003 paper, “Measuring Pro-Poor Growth”, Ravallion and Chen provide the 
following definition of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ (PPG): 
 





The mathematical form of the equation has been simplif ed in order to make its 
meaning more transparent for a general readership. T e essence of the definition is 
that as an inequality index, such as the Gini coeffici nt, rises, the rate of PPG will 
decline relative to the actual rate of growth. Similarly, if the index falls, the rate of 
PPG will rise relative to the actual rate of growth. 
 
We leave aside the incidental technical question of whether the change in inequality 
actually affects the poor. For instance, there could be a reduction of inequality due to 
the changing position of the middle class relative o that of the rich, but this would not 
necessarily have any direct beneficial impact on the poor. 
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How does the Ravallion-Chen definition compare to that of Kakwani? In Working 
Paper #1 of the International Poverty Centre, 2004, Kakwani, Khandker and Son 
provide the following definition of what they call the ‘Poverty Equivalent Growth 
Rate’: 
 
The Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate = the actual growth rate x (the total poverty 
elasticity/poverty elasticity of growth) 
 
The ‘Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate’ will be pro-poor if it is higher than the actual 
growth rate. This would depend on the definitions of elasticity, which we now must 
clarify. The ‘Poverty Elasticity of Growth’ signifies the percentage change in the 
poverty headcount relative to the percentage change in income per capita.  
 
The ‘Total Poverty Elasticity’ in this definition combines both the ‘Poverty Elasticity 
of Growth’ and the ‘Poverty Elasticity of Inequality’. The latter is the percentage 
change in the poverty headcount relative to the percentage change in the Gini 
Coefficient (the measure of inequality). 
 
Hence, if the ‘Total Poverty Elasticity’ exceeds the ‘Poverty Elasticity of Growth’, 
then the reduction in inequality is reducing poverty and, by definition, the Poverty 
Equivalent Growth Rate exceeds the actual growth rate. Once one focuses on the 
essence of each definition, one can understand that the two operating definitions of 
‘Pro-Poor Growth’ differ only marginally. In practie, they seem to amount to the 
same approach.  
 
An Annoying Complication 
Both definitions incorporate concerns for growth and i equality. The objective of both, 
in a sense, is to maximize the ‘Total Poverty Elasticity’ (with respect to both the 
growth of income and changes in inequality). But there remains an annoying 
complication. 
 
This complication relates to the possible interaction between faster growth and greater 
equity—a topic that we introduced in our discussion of the World Development 
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Report 2006. A specification of the determinants of poverty reduction probably 
should be fleshed out as follows: 
 
PR = y + g + Y-1 + G-1 + yg 
 
Where PR is Poverty Reduction, y is the rate of growth of income per capita, g the 
change in the Gini coefficient (or similar measure of inequality), Y-1 is income per 
capita lagged, G-1 is the Gini Coefficient lagged, and yg is the interaction between the 
growth rate of income per capita and the change in inequality. 
 
Some microeconomic evidence suggests that there is a po itive link between reduced 
inequality and faster growth but cross-country regressions are generally inconclusive 
on this link. In other words, the jury is still out on the question of whether the two 
factors have a generally complementary impact. 
 
In order to give a more concrete illustration of these concerns, we draw on the 
examination by Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2004) of patterns of Poverty Equivalent 




In the late 1980s/early 1990s, growth was high (about 8 per cent) in Thailand but 
inequality was rising. Thus, the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate was lower than the 
actual growth rate. The former averaged close to 6 per cent. 
 
Toward the mid 1990s, economic growth slowed to about 6 per cent while inequality 
was also dropping. Hence, the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate was higher than the 
actual growth rate. The former averaged about 8 per cent. 
 
But one might well ask whether there could have been a trade-off between growth and 
equity during the mid 1990s. Was it the case, for example, that growth slowed 
precisely because equity was increased too much?  
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Examining the figure, one might well ask: which period should be preferred, and on 
what basis? The earlier period had more inequality bu  higher growth while the latter 
period had less inequality but also lower growth. 
 
If we use either the Kakwani or Ravallion definition f ‘Pro-Poor Growth’, on what 
basis do we prefer one period over the other? Do we prefer, for example, the mid 
1990s because of the decrease in inequality—even though growth was falling?  
 
Let us sharpen the contrast by drawing an artificial figure (Figure 3). Let us assume 
that from 1990 to 1994, the actual rate of growth was 6 per cent while the Poverty 




Let us further assume that during 1995, growth dropped sharply and that the actual 
rate of growth during 1996 to 2000 was 4 per cent. However, during this latter period, 
inequality also dropped so that the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate remained 5 per 
cent. 
 
Again, we might ask the question: which period is preferable? Growth champions 
might opt for the first period, perhaps because of greater gains among the non-poor 
due to higher overall growth. In contrast, equity advocates might opt for the second 
slower-growth period because of the achievement of higher equity. ‘Poverty 
Pragmatists’ might end up being indifferent: after all, the Poverty Equivalent Growth 
Rate is the same in both periods.   
 
The underlying conceptual problem, we would argue, is that the Kakwani and 
Ravallion definitions of PPG have, indeed, converged towards a common pragmatism. 
In other words, they have chosen to mix and match bot means, i.e., faster growth and 
greater equity, in order to maximize the impact on p verty. How exactly the impact is 
achieved is of secondary concern. 
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Once one carefully studies the two definitions of PPG and the implications of 
applying them, one should recognize that the Great D bate on ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ has 
effectively collapsed. The implication of using either definition is that growth is no 
longer ‘pro-poor’ or ‘anti-poor’: it is just more or less ‘poverty-reducing’. And this 
reduction of poverty could be due to either faster growth or greater equity. 
 
The dead-end of this debate has originated, we would argue, from valuing equity 
primarily instrumentally. The motivating concern for equity has been concentrated on 
poverty reduction alone. Within this framework, achieving lower inequality (across 
the whole distribution) is merely a means, neither mo e nor less important than 
general increases in income. Greater equity (above and beyond poverty reduction) is 
not valued intrinsically. 
 
IV.  Moving Beyond Abstractions 
There is another fundamental problem, we would argue, with the way that the inter-
relationships among growth, inequality and poverty reduction are conceptualized in 
‘modern’ discussions of these issues. The discussion  start, in effect, ‘two steps 
removed’ from real development processes. 
 
First, the three phenomena are treated abstractly as hough they are independent, 
motive forces, and can interact among themselves to produce additional effects. 
Secondly, for regression purposes, their conceptualization is usually reduced to their 
statistical specification (e.g., mean income per capita, the Gini coefficient and the 
headcount ratio). Hence, after a while, we tend to assume that the regression 
specification is a perfectly adequate representation of reality. 
 
But the growth of income per capita is equivalent to the increase in the income-
weighted mean income per person of a population sample. In other words, the 
specification can be heavily influenced by the income weight of the richer members of 
society.  
 
Changes in inequality are identified with changes in the Gini Index (which ranges 
from 0 to 1). But this index is a measure of relative inequality. It is not structured to 
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record changes in absolute inequality, namely, absolute differences in income levels. 
We will return to this point later in this paper. 
 
Lastly, poverty reduction is identified with raising household per capita income or 
expenditures above a socially designated monetary poverty line. But where this line is 
drawn is fundamentally a matter of social choice or convention. 
 
The major point that we want to develop in relation t  these issues is that all three of 
the above outcomes (growth, inequality and poverty) represent different dimensions 
(or conceptualizations) of the same underlying process of the expansion of total 
output and its corresponding flow to various factors f production within multiple 
sectors of the economy. 
 
V. The Kuznets Contribution 
Let us step back historically and revisit the work f Simon Kuznets, one of the most 
well-known representatives of classic development economics, post World War II, to 
see whether we can identify and pursue a qualitatively new path of analysis and 
conceptualization with regard to growth, inequality and poverty reduction. 
 
Much of the analysis of inequality by post-war development economists was 
decisively influenced by the utilisation of a dualistic framework. This approach 
assumed a large subsistence, stagnant agricultural sector containing surplus labour 
existing side by side with a small, growing and dynamic capitalist urban industrial 
sector characterized by rising productivity. The outlines of this framework are often 
attributed to Arthur Lewis (see Lewis 1954). 
 
At this juncture, an important point to emphasize is that this analytical framework has 
provided richer and more concrete empirical results than those provided by much of 
the modern abstract, regression-driven analysis of inequality. 
 
Drawing on this tradition, Kuznets was concerned prima ily with longer-term secular 
trends in income levels and disparities. He concentrated much of his research on the 
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characteristics of what he called modern socially ‘disruptive’ economic growth. His 
limited research on inequality was essentially an outgrowth of this focus. 
 
His well-known ‘Inverted-U Hypothesis’ was designed to provide a general 
framework for understanding patterns of inequality as modern economic growth 
induced substantial increases in the average incomes f nations (Kuznets 1955). His 
hypothesis was based on two simple initial assumptions: 1) a significant income gap 
exists between rural agriculture and urban industry and 2) there is greater intra-
sectoral inequality within urban industry than within rural agriculture. 
 
As the labour force migrates from labour-surplus agriculture to labour-demanding 
industry, the weight of the sector with greater inequality rises while the gap between 
the two sectors is also likely to rise. As a consequence, overall inequality at first rises, 
than stabilizes for some time, and eventually falls (Figure 4). In other words, its 
pattern looks like an inverted U. Kuznets basically ccepted Lewis’ assumption that 
for a while a large pool of surplus labour, originat g in agriculture, tends to hold 




Even though Kuznets’ Inverted-U Hypothesis has exert d continuous fascination for 
researchers since the 1950s (with some even lauding it as an ‘iron-law’ empirical 
regularity), Kuznets’ own empirical work was basically restricted to observing the 
historical experience of three developed countries, the US, England and Germany. As 
he claimed himself, his results were “5% empirical nformation, 95% speculation”. 
 
VI.  Why Did Inequality Eventually Fall? 
Although his analysis provides a plausible explanatio  of why inequality might, at 
first, increase, as labour migrates from agriculture to industry, his explanation for the 
eventual fall of inequality appears less compelling. I  his 1955 paper, he gives, for 
example, two possible explanations for the eventual fall.  
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One is that ‘the dynamism of a growing and free economic society’ constantly creates 
new industries and new competing capitalists. One can imagine, for instance, the rise 
of Bill Gates’ wealth and influence compared to those f the long-established 
Rockefeller family. But why this would necessarily lower overall inequality is open to 
question. 
 
The second explanation that Kuznets provides—which is more convincing—is that 
inequality eventually diminished because of the rising economic and political 
bargaining power of the lower-income groups (i.e., the working classes) after the 
initial wrenching dislocation of the Industrial Revolution, and after they had become 
more established urban residents and more organised. 
 
This important dimension is obviously missing in much of the modern analysis of 
inequality and growth. Since such analysis is focused on poverty reduction, it is 
usually assumed that ‘the poor’ are not capable of becoming a potent political force. 
However, several economic historians have followed this line of enquiry in trying to 
explain the eventual decline of inequality in some of the developed economies. 
 
For instance, Justman and Gradstein (1999) have investigated the impact of the 
Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom on the political evolution of urban 
workers. They find that the Industrial Revolution triggered a process of 
‘democratisation’ that shifted power from the elite few to the many, mainly urban 
workers, who through the course of industrialisation had managed to secure modest 
economic resources that elevated them above poverty levels. 
 
This economic advancement led, in turn, to increased political activity that prompted 
the Reform Act of 1867, which extended the right to vote to at least the upper levels 
of the working class. Such a movement also led to a shift in the ‘distributional bias’ of 
public policies more towards the working class. This entailed a number of specific 
reforms: more progressive taxes and transfers; increased public investment in 
education; legalisation of trade unions; old-age pensions and some social insurance 
for the ill; and public provision of services, such as roads, water and public transport. 
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It is important to recognize such political factors in explaining changes in inequality, 
especially since they are often now neglected. For Kuznets, however, such social and 
political changes were conditioned by deeper structu al ransformations. The Kuznets 
analysis of trends in inequality starts from the prmise that a rapid rise in labour 
productivity occasions acceleration in the ‘Structural Transformation’ of the economy 
and this upheaval brings in its train an ensuing ‘Social Transformation’.  
 
It is this Social Transformation that is the basis for a trend break in the income 
distribution of a country. Otherwise, the distribution could remain relatively stable 
over a long period of time. 
 
It is important to also note that, for Kuznets, modern economic development implies 
dramatic changes in 1) the distribution of resources and productivities across 
economic sectors and 2) the distribution of factor endowments and factor returns 
across economic agents. Such transformations underlie any significant secular 
changes in both growth and distribution. 
 
There is certainly room for policy interventions in determining the distributional 
impact of growth but the implication of Kuznets’ analysis is that such interventions 
would need to modify, somehow, the structural features of the economy. For instance, 
they would need to significantly influence such factors as technological development, 
relative productivities across sectors, the distribu ional bias of public finances and the 
underlying distribution of assets and resources. 
 
Instead of having a ready explanation for the projected fall in inequality that he 
posited from his two-sector model, Kuznets was, in fact, initially puzzled by it. 
Following the conventional assumptions of his day, he expected the concentration of 
savings among the rich to have a cumulative regressiv  effect on wealth and income 
inequality.  
 
Kuznets’ views are emblematic of post-war Development Economics, which was 
generally ‘equity-insensitive’. The prevailing view was that development hinges on a 
rise in labour productivity and such a rise is dependent on accelerated capital 
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accumulation. Such accumulation is not possible, however, without a larger national 
savings ratio. Since high-income groups save a larger proportion of their incomes, 
inequality of the distribution of income is a necessary condition for rapid capitalist 
growth. 
 
VII.  Redistribution with Growth 
Growth was indeed rapid in the 1960s and early 1970s but inequality remained high 
and poverty remained deep and pervasive. In light of such problems, eventually 
redistribution had to be put back much more explicitly on the development agenda.  
 
An influential 1974 book, Redistribution with Growth, produced by collaboration 
between the World Bank and the Institute for Development Studies, epitomized the 
major shift at that time towards a heightened concern for equity. In this respect, it 
reminds us of the recent emphasis on equity in the 2000s, at least in the form of 
poverty reduction, and poverty reduction strategies. 
 
The authors of this book were opposed to the strategy of maximizing the growth of 
Gross National Product, which had prevailed through the 1960s and early 1970s. They 
argued that since the richest 40 per cent of the population usually accounted for three-
quarters of total income, the weight of their income would basically determine the rate 
of economic growth. In response, they proposed an adjusted measure of growth that 
accorded greater weight to the income of the poorer deciles of the population. 
 
The authors also noted that a strategy focused on maximizing growth would 
invariably entail a series of pro-rich policy measures. These would include lower 
income and corporate taxes, wage-restraint policies and monetary policies targeted at 
low inflation. Such policies have, in fact, become th norm in recent years, but have 
often been adorned with claims that they would be ‘pro-poor’ in their impact.  
 
The book also highlights for us the limitations on the redistributive agenda at that time. 
For example, while it advocated a redistribution of investment, it refrained from 
advocating a redistribution of assets. Its general policy message was to advocate 
altering over time the underlying pattern of concentration of both physical and human 
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capital. This approach was encapsulated in the call to ‘Invest in the Poor’. For this 
purpose, it stressed the reallocation of public investment.  
 
While it acknowledged that such a reallocation might occasion some short-term 
sacrifice of growth, it affirmed that the longer-tem ‘trickling-up’ benefits of such a 
reallocation would outweigh any short-term disadvantages. However, it did not 
advocate any redistribution of the current stock of wealth, primarily because of the 
danger of the political opposition of the rich.  
 
Instead, it favoured concentrating on reallocation of investment over time on the basis 
of maintaining a rapidly growing economy. So redistribution followed growth, in 
effect, and was restrained from colliding with its supposed mainsprings. 
 
VIII.  ‘Pro-Poor’ Versus ‘Inclusive’ Growth 
It appears that since 2008 we have begun entering a new period of development 
thinking, one that is less preoccupied with equity concerns, and more inclined to stress 
the importance of growth. This preoccupation has been r inforced, no doubt, by the 
collapse of growth in developed economies and the spr ad of global financial crisis 
and recession. 
 
Well before the global crisis hit, some prominent development agencies, such as the 
World Bank and the U.K. Department for International Development, were scuttling 
the strategy of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ in favour of what they called ‘Inclusive Growth’. It 
is still debatable whether this change represents a progressive or regressive 
development. Many questions remain. For example, how ‘inclusive’ is ‘Inclusive 
Growth’, and what does this term mean? How equitable is it? And for that matter, 
how equitable is ‘Pro-Poor Growth’? 
 
In order to try to address these questions, we set up an artificial experiment. Let us 
choose a country, such as Brazil or Colombia, in which inequality is high. In both of 
these countries, the income share of the richest 10 per cent of the population is about 
five times higher than that of the poorest 40 per cent. So the level of income per 
person of the richest 10 per cent is 20 times higher than t t of the poorest 40 per cent 
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(who have four times more people). Hence, if the income per person of the bottom 40 
per cent were £100, the income level of the richest 10 per cent would be £2000. Refer 
to Table 1. The absolute income gap between the two is thus £1900. 
 
Table 1  
 
We examine the bottom 40 per cent of the population in order to be ‘inclusive’. This 
share could easily include some of the non-poor as well as the poor. We could use the 
bottom 50 per cent or 60 per cent of the population but our basic conclusions would 
not be altered. The thrust of our conclusions would also not be significantly changed 
if we used a country with lower levels of inequality than Brazil or Colombia,  
 
We have to attach some kind of meaning to ‘inclusive’ that differs from that of ‘pro-
poor’. So we assume that the poor do not benefit ‘disproportionately’ from growth, 
otherwise we would have to call the pattern of growth ‘pro-poor’. Hence, for our 
experiment, we assume that everyone’s income increases t least at the same rate 
(implying that everyone is ‘included’ in growth on a supposedly equal basis). This is 
conventionally considered to be ‘distribution-neutral’ growth. 
 
The Table shows us that whether we assume five per cent growth for all or 10 per cent 
growth for all, the absolute income gap between the richest 10 per cent and the 
poorest 40 per cent widens after one year (see the last column), and widens further 
thereafter. 
 
In fact, even if we assume ‘Pro-Poor Growth’, namely, that the growth of the income 
per person of the richest tenth is only five per cent while that of the poorest 40 per 
cent is 10 per cent, the absolute income gap would stil  widen.  
 
Hence, when we attempt to measure inequality in ‘absolute’ terms, namely, in actual 
differences in income, we find that even ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ might not be significantly 
redistributive. Moreover, in absolute terms, ‘Inclusive Growth’ could have a 




IX.  Some Concluding Remarks 
What are some of the general implications that can be drawn from this paper? The 
first major implication is methodological. Based on evaluating recent discussions of 
growth, inequality and poverty reduction and reviewing the early analytical 
contributions of Simon Kuznets, this paper has argued that we need to shift applied 
research away from abstract regression analysis to a m re sophisticated and concrete 
focus on the structural causes of the secular trends in both inequality and growth—and, 
by implication, trends in poverty. 
 
A second major implication, which relates to the last section on ‘Pro-Poor’ versus 
‘Inclusive’ Growth is that there can be considerable room for redistribution of income 
without significantly altering the basic structure of an inequitable distribution. 
 
A third implication that could be drawn from the last section is that we need to 
concentrate more on issues of absolute inequality. While measures of relative 
inequality remain important, this concept of inequality is, in fact, a more abstract and 
problematic concept for most people.  
 
A fourth implication is that while the framework of‘Inclusive Growth’ might well 
serve a useful purpose, such as broadening the concrn for greater equity to include 
segments of the non-poor, those who have been ‘excluded’ from the fruits of growth 
would still need to ‘disproportionately’ benefit, for an extended period, from any 
growth process in order for the term to have any credible meaning. Hence, instead of 
being qualitatively different from ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ in this respect, ‘Inclusive 
Growth’ should imply an effort to extend disproporti nate benefits to a wider share of 
the population. 
 
However, a fifth implication of this paper is that tying redistributive policies too 
tightly to growth policies, or equity objectives too closely to growth objectives, is a 
major mistake—despite the laudable effort by many in the international development 
community to use ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ to counter the hegemonic growth-centred 
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approach to development.  Note that even under the rubric of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’, the 
adjective ‘pro-poor’ still modifies the noun ‘growth’, not development in general. 
 
A corollary is that greater equity should be valued as an end in itself—not primarily as 
a means that could advance the cause of growth. Moreove , redistributive policies 
need to be addressed in their own right. Thus, the title of the seminal 1974 book 
mentioned earlier in this paper, ‘Redistribution with Growth’, should imply that 
redistribution is an independently important area of concern, which either precedes or 
runs in parallel with any concern for growth. 
 
Furthermore, a sixth implication of this paper is that meaningful redistribution will 
have to involve a redistribution of the underlying allocation of physical and human 
capital. This paper does not enter the debate on whether such a redistribution should 
imply reallocating the current stock of productive w alth or reallocating over time 
investments in such wealth. Either approach would lea , in any case, to a significantly 
more radical approach than is currently being followed. 
 
In this paper we have noted that political costs (namely, losses for the rich) are usually 
cited as a rationale for avoiding redistributive policies. We would emphasize, in stark 
contrast, that the majority of the working population need to mobilize themselves 
politically so that the ‘political costs’ of not undertaking redistribution become 
prohibitively high.  
 
This point, which is a seventh implication of this paper, relates to the earlier 
discussion on Kuznets’ recognition (which has generally been neglected by the recent 
literature on inequality) that the rising economic and political power of the lower-
income groups during industrialization eventually helped to lower inequality in 
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Figure 1. The ‘Poverty-Growth-Inequality Triangle’ 
 
 





Source: Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2004). 
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Table 1. Inclusive Growth and Absolute Income Gaps 
Growth Scenar io  Income of Poorest 
40% 




Star ting Point  
(Year  0) 
£100 £2000 £1900 
5% growth for  all  
(Year  1) 
£105 £2100 £1995 
10% growth for  all  
(Year  1) 
£110 £2200 £2090 
10% growth: Poorest 40%  
5% growth: Richest 10%  
(Year 1) 
£110 £2100 £1990 
Source: Author 
